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Abstract The article examines the political challenge and significance of forgiveness as
an indispensable response to the inherently imperfect and tragic nature of political life
through the lens of the existential, narrative-inspired judging sensibility. While the
political significance of forgiveness has been broadly recognized in transitional justice
and reconciliation contexts, the question of its importance and appropriateness in the
wake of grave injustice and suffering has commonly been approached through con-
structing a self-centred, rule-based framework, defining forgiveness in terms of a moral
duty or virtue. Reliant on a set of prefabricated moral standards, however, this approach
risks abstracting from the historical, situated condition of human political existence and
thus arguably stands at a remove from the very quandaries and imperfections of the
political world, which it purports to address. Against this background, this article draws
on Albert Camus’s and Hannah Arendt’s aesthetic, worldly judging sensibility and its
ability to kindle the process of coming to terms with the absurd, and perhaps unforgiv-
able character of reality after evil. As an aptitude to engage the world in its particularity,
plurality and contingency rather than seeking to subdue and tame it under prefabricated
standards of thought, namely, worldly judgement is able to reveal how past tragedies
have arisen from the ambiguity of human engagement in the world and thereby also
elicit the distinctly human capacities of beginning anew and resisting such actions in the
future. As such, I suggest, it is well-suited to bring into clearer focus and confront the
main political challenge and significance of forgiveness: how to acknowledge the
seriousness of the wrongs committed, yet also enable the possibility of a new beginning
and restore among former enemies the sense of responsibility for the shared world.
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Introduction
While not commonly examined in its potential political capacity in the field of
philosophical literature, forgiveness has been broadly praised and called for for its
moral and political significance in transitional justice and reconciliation contexts. It is
considered to be a highly valuable response to wrongdoing able to break the vicious
cycles of resentment and vengeful violence, renew and reform broken relationships,
and pave the way for the society to move on into a democratic future (see e.g. Minow
1998, 14). At the same time, the insistence on the importance of forgiveness remains
mired in a paradoxical recognition that the decision to forgive mass injustice and
suffering – what would seem to be Bunforgivable^ – may be not only impossible but
also morally undesirable, enabling further evasions of responsibility and ultimately
betraying the sense of justice. This paradox, in turn, often is approached through
constructing a normative, self-centred, rule-based framework, which, defining forgive-
ness in terms of a moral duty or virtue, is evoked to resolve the question of whether and
when past evils and wrongs should be forgiven (see Minow 1998; Wiesenthal 1998;
Gobodo-Madikizela 2004; see also MacLachlan 2009, 135–9; Pettigrove 2006, 490).
Reliant on a set of prefabricated moral standards, however, this approach risks
abstracting from the historical, situated condition of human political existence and thus
arguably stands at a remove from the very quandaries and imperfections of the political
world, which it purports to address. Against this background, this article draws on the
existential, narrative-inspired and representative judging sensibility oriented by the
principle of love of the world to bring to the forefront the distinctively political
relevance of forgiveness. Specifically as developed in the work of Albert Camus and
Hannah Arendt, aesthetic, worldly judgement is characterized as an aptitude to engage
the world in its particularity, plurality and contingency rather than seeking to subdue
and tame it under prefabricated standards of thought. As an ability to thereby reveal
how past tragedies have arisen from the ambiguity of human engagement in the world
and constantly disclose the human character of political affairs, worldly judgement
arguably stands at the core of the difficult process of coming to terms with the absurd,
and perhaps unforgivable character of reality after evil and of eliciting the distinctly
human capacities of resisting such actions in the future. As such, I suggest, it is well-
suited to bring into clearer focus and confront the main political challenge and
significance of forgiveness as an indispensable response to the inherently imperfect
and tragic nature of political life: how to acknowledge the seriousness of the wrongs
committed, yet also enable the possibility of a new beginning.1 Specifically, I argue, it
is able to foreground judgement on the appropriateness of forgiveness as an activity
underlain by the situated and ambiguous process of assuming responsibility for the
common world.
1 In this respect, this article corresponds to the recent attempts, in for instance Mihai and Thaler (2014), to
examine the distinct nature and challenges of political apology. See especially MacLachlan (2014), Mihai
(2013), and Thaler (2012).
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The argument proceeds as follows. In the first section, I explore Arendt’s insights
into the political significance and challenge of forgiveness as it arises from the tragic
nature of political action in the world and point to the inadequacy of the predominant
moral discourse on forgiveness in adequately recognizing and confronting it. In turn,
the section discloses the distinct political relevance of the aesthetic, representative
judging sensibility in its ability to inspire the process of reconciliation with reality,
with the often absurd and always plural character of the world. The second section
illuminates the suggested shift of focus from a moral to a worldly perspective on
forgiveness through two chosen literary works, Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela’s A Human
Being Died That Night and Vitomil Zupan’s Minuet for Guitar. In the third section, on
this basis, I elaborate on how narrative-inspired, worldly judgement and its underlying
purpose of reconciliation with reality can illuminate forgiveness in its political signif-
icance by foregrounding it as a situated practice undertaken for the sake of human
plurality and the common world.
The Political Importance and Paradox of Forgiveness, and the Limitations
of the Predominant Moral Discourse
Accompanying the proclamations on the worldly importance and value of forgiveness
in transitional contexts, is the equally strongly voiced recognition of its ambivalent
nature. On the one hand, a judgement to grant forgiveness is said to empower the
victims of atrocity. Through relinquishing the often disempowering and self-destructive
feelings of resentment and hatred and forgiving the perpetrators, the victims can reclaim
their dignity. While affirming the suffering endured and the moral wrongfulness of the
actions done to them, the argument goes, they can thus also renew their relationship
with former oppressors and contribute to the broader project of reconciliation and
societal reconstruction after violent and divided pasts (see e.g. Minow 1998, 14–15).
On the other hand, however, forgiveness might also entail a further humiliation and
devaluation of the victim, testifying to his or her inability to view and affirm the past
suffering as an unjust and unacceptable violation that should instead rightly invite
outrage and indignation (Minow 1998, 17–18). This danger is especially pronounced in
cases when forgiveness is granted on behalf of the victims by governments or public
officials in the form of, for instance, amnesty or impunity. As such, as it has often been
emphasized, forgiveness may amount to nothing less than a betrayal of the victims’
suffering, involving as it may do not only a foregoing of just punishment but also a
refusal to even acknowledge the harm done (Minow 1998, 16–17).
This difficulty can be seen as underlain by a more fundamental dilemma, well-echoed
in Arendt’s explicit recognition of the importance (and paradox) of forgiveness in terms
of the way it stems from the tragic nature of political action in the world. As opposed to
vengeance as Bthe natural, automatic reaction to transgression^ that stirs into motion Bthe
relentless automatism of the action process,^ forgiveness is distinguished as Bthe only
reaction which does not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by
the act which provoked it^ (Arendt 1958, 241). Arendt then affirms forgiveness as a form
of political action, capable of effecting a meaningful change in the political world. In this
focus, she prefigures recent attempts to explore the human faculty of forgiveness not as a
duty or virtue, but Ba moral power^which has important performative dimensions and is
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not reducible to a change in emotional or mental states (see Card 2002, 173–188; see also
e.g. MacLachlan 2009, 145). Forgiveness is an all-important political capacity, Arendt
holds, in light of political action’s Birreversibility:^ the fact that we always act into and in
the midst of the world constituted by a plurality of human actors, wills and intentions and
that the consequences of each of our actions are therefore bound to be Bunending,
infinite, and ultimately uncontrollable^ (Arendt 1958, 236–7). Forgiveness is crucial
because it Bserves to undo the deeds of the past^ in the sense of releasing us from the
overwhelming consequences of our past actions that might stupefy our potentials to
engage our freedom in the world in the future (Arendt 1958, 237). As conveyed most
clearly in Arendt’s insight that Bthe deed is forgiven for the sake of who did it,^ then,
forgiveness is explicitly praised for its ability to kindle the human potentials for political
action and an affirmation of a new beginning (Arendt 1958, 241). At the same time,
however, Arendt’s take on forgiveness also carries a response to her radical awareness of
the capacity of political action to bring about Bincalculable evil.^Given political action’s
unpredictability, its capacity to initiate a plethora of unintended consequences and
processes that return to the agent in alien, essentially unrecognizable forms (Arendt
1958, 190–2), it can radically confound our ability of judging right from wrong, upset
our deepest moral expectations and the established ways of relating to the world, and
thus also challenge the very possibility of forgiveness. Themain challenge of her time, as
Arendt repeatedly pointed out, was the emergence of deeds human beings could neither
punish nor forgive (Arendt 2003, 55).2
Yet, in the transitional justice literature, the prevalent emphasis on the political value
of forgiveness as well as the accompanying predicament remain strongly underlain by a
broader philosophical tendency to conceive of forgiveness as an essentially self-
centred, inner, psychological or therapeutic exercise in overcoming resentment that
enables personal healing and well-being after the traumatic experience of evil (see
Pettigrove 2006, 488–9; MacLachlan 2009, 137, 145). The other-directedness of
forgiveness, to be sure, is commonly recognized. When considering the appropriateness
of forgiveness after grave wrongs, theorists have frequently evoked the need for
sympathetic, narrative understanding and an appreciation of Bmoral luck,^ that is, the
fact that any action, its meaning and implications do not lie within our powers alone but
are significantly conditioned by things beyond our control (Williams 1981).3 Scholars
have argued that the practice of forgiving is closely linked to the capacity to place
oneself into the situation of the other and look upon the world from his or her
perspective, to weave the occurrences of wrongdoings and sufferings into stories, and
thereby also effect Bthe temporalization of relations.^ Narrative understanding, in this
vein, can reveal how the past can be recognized as something that cannot be undone,
2 The true horror of totalitarianism, for Arendt, lay not simply in the sheer horrendousness of its crimes, but in
the fact that it has definitely Bbrought to light the ruin of our categories of thought and standards of judgement^
(Arendt 1994, 318). For in the wake of its terrifying neglect for all utilitarian considerations, of crimes that
could not be traced to mere quest for power for power’s sake, nor to Bany other humanly understandable
sinfulness,^ and of its general Barrogant emancipation from reality and experience,^ not only the traditional
categories of guilt and innocence, but the very distinction between truth and falsehood, were left curiously
devoid of all meaning (Arendt 1994, 350, 354–5). The evil of totalitarianism, for Arendt, instead rested in its
attempt to destroy the very humanity in human beings – what she called the making of human beings
superfluous as human beings (Arendt 2004, 620).
3 This proposition is often manifested in the appeal of Bthere but for the grace of God go I″ (see e.g. Thomas
2009, 127–31).
Philosophia
ignored or avoided in a way that nevertheless affirms the human ability to respond to it
and begin anew (Griswold 2007, xxii, 98, 100). An understanding of the context of the
wrongdoing as well as the broader insight into the circumstances that have shaped the
lives and choices of the perpetrator, for instance, are considered to be crucial in
Bseparating the wrongdoer from the wrong which has been committed^ (North 1998,
26). For thus it becomes possible to see in him or her a person that is more than
whatever he or she has done, and also offer grounds for forgiveness based on the
recognition that he or she can be a different person in the future (see e.g. North 1998,
24–6). Nonetheless, the understanding and judging processes commonly are conceived
as empathetic exercises, in which the victim or the third person seeks to identify with
the wrongdoer, to penetrate to the utmost kernel of his or her subjectivity and on this
basis determine whether or not the person in question is deserving of forgiveness.
Thence, indeed, arises the model form of forgiveness as an interpersonal, reciprocal
moral relation (Griswold 2007, xvi). This sensibility, in other words, arguably remains
mired in the self-centred focus, depicting judgement on whether or not to forgive as a
rational, determinant decision that is concerned with the essentially inner, subjective
states of the victim and the wrongdoer. The proper change in perpetrators’ attitudes, as
expressed in, for instance, acts of confession, apology or repentance, on this view, is
followed by the victims’ foregoing of resentment and a grant of forgiveness.
In this way, however, the difficulty of forgiveness as a response to the tragic nature
of political action is addressed through the traditional philosophical notion of rule,
where the appropriate standards for forgiveness are derived from one’s attitudes toward
and interaction with one’s self and then imposed upon others and the world from the
outside and above (see Arendt 1958, 237–8). In transitional justice and reconciliation
debates, accordingly, forgiveness is usually conceptualized with regard to the
preconceived end of reconciliation and/or justice. The sovereign penchant can be seen
for instance in the broadly liberal insistence on making forgiveness conditioned upon a
framework of moral principles which are supposed to mark the advent of a new, just
future. Similarly, it characterizes the communitarian bent to conceive of forgiveness as
a step that is necessary for the greater good of a harmonious community (see Schaap
2005, 73–5). Yet, confronting the world with a prefabricated, supposedly universal
framework of moral standards, this model of forgiveness risks abstracting from its
purported goal of understanding the situational factors conditioning a particular action
and so missing out on a sustained reflection of how past wrongdoing arose from human
embeddedness into a broader field of forces beyond the immediate control of the agent.
By implication, it can be said to strangely obscure precisely the potential moral and
political value of forgiveness most praised amongst its proponents – its capacity, as an
alternative to vindictive resentment and hatred, to realize the possibility of a new
beginning, to re-establish relationships between victims and perpetrators and, while
acknowledging the seriousness of the wrongs committed, restore in them the sense of
responsibility for the shared world.
To substantiate these claims, it merits considering the existentialists’ insights into the
political dangers of confronting political affairs with a set of supposedly universal moral
standards. The reduction of political judgement into the role of mere determinant
application of prefabricated yardsticks onto the particularities of the political world from
the outside and above is troubling because it cannot but fail to account for the
phenomenal, situated nature of political affairs and threatens to obscure the existence
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of the public realm. In other words, it risks obviating the process of what Arendt calls
Breconciliation with reality,^ of understanding and making sense of the world, which
corresponds to a fundamental, Bexistential,^ human need and the underlying aim of
political judgement (see Arendt 2006, 257; 1994, 307–8). The world of political affairs
is grounded upon the constitutive existential condition of human plurality and consists
of individuals manifesting their distinct human capacities for action and speech, begin-
ning anew and appearing to each other (Arendt 1958, 55–7). To address the ensuing
plurality, contingency and unpredictability of political affairs, Arendt was convinced,
abstract standards of thought proved profoundly inadequate. For in attempting to explain
and construe the realm of Bmere^ appearances in terms of supposedly deeper and truer
realities, thought to lie above or beneath them, grounding or causing them, they are
bound to grow less and less informed by and increasingly distant from particular
occurrences and facts in the realm of human affairs and ensue in an atrophied sense of
worldly reality. This is politically highly dangerous because humans are essentially
worldly beings. As Arendt (1978, 20) writes, humans are not only in the world as
perceiving subjects, but also of the world, as appearances to be perceived by others. As
such, they depend on constantly coming to terms with whatever happens and inscribing
themselves in meaningful pasts, on kindling a shared sense of the world for the very
sense of their own selves as autonomous agents, able to engage with and respond to
ever-changing political reality (Arendt 1994, 310; Arendt 2004, 614).
This need is particularly pressing in those moments of transition, of rupture or break in
established ways of being in the world brought forth by violence, evil and suffering that
can no longer be bridged through appeals to prefabricated frameworks of judgement, but
require the whole of society to thoroughly rethink the bases of its identity, its myths,
memories and relevant histories (see Ricoeur in Kearney 1995, 37–8). The predominant
moral discourse on forgiveness and its reliance on a prefabricated register of absolute
standards, in this light, is politically troubling because it short-circuits the situated process
of coming to terms with and assuming responsibility for past wrongs. It not only fails to
adequately account for the destruction of the common world and the established modes of
human interaction brought about by grave wrongs (see Carse and Tirrell 2010, 43–5).
Presupposing the existence of a shared moral order between the victims, the perpetrators
and the broader society that must first of all be reconstituted through processes of public
narration and judgement, it also clouds the political significance of a decision to grant
forgiveness, obscuring the crucial questions of in which case and why it might be an
appropriate way of reckoning with the past as well as how it would contribute to the
building of a just society in the future. Standing at a remove from the public realm, this
discourse of forgiveness might indeed seem to amount to an Ba priori exclusion of
criminality and, thus, responsibility^ – as Soyinka argues with reference to the South
African grant of amnesty (see Soyinka 1999, 31). Worse still, it could be argued in a
Nietzschean flair that, thus construed, the discourse of forgiveness threatens to itself
assume a somewhat vengeful and domineering air. Through self-centred practices of
contrition, apology and repentance it might perversely keep both victims and perpetrators
mired by a traumatic past, seeking to escape the ambiguity of worldly struggles into a
narcissistic dream of self-righteousness and self-sufficiency, and wary of, or even resentful
about, a new future (see Garrard and McNaughton 2010, 26–8).
Against this background, I now turn to delve into the existential aesthetic judging
sensibility oriented by the principle of love of the world, highlighting its political
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significance in its ability to inspire and retain attention on the ambiguous process of
reconciling with the burden of a tragic past. Predicated upon a deep-seated awareness
of the irreversible loss of eternal standards and absolutes in modernity, the existential
aesthetic, worldly sensibility is expressly political in that it, rather than seeking to flee,
assumes and faces up to the absurd and ambiguous condition of political judgement as
it arises out of the fundamental worldliness or historicity of human political existence.
The awareness of the absurd, as developed in the thought of Camus, on the one hand
means that we are always already being in the world, that our judgement is situated,
enmeshed in a web of worldly relationships – and that it therefore cannot clamour for
absolute certainty and transparency, and hope to endow the world with absolute
foundations (Camus 1991, 8). On the other hand, however, Camus’s absurd sensibility
opens the way for reimagining political judgement as an aesthetic practice, orienting the
focus on how to kindle the human judging capacity to engage and endow with meaning
the world in its phenomenal particularity and plurality – all the while aware that all of
its meanings and values are human and therefore provisional in character (Camus 1991,
89; see also Hayden 2013, 198–9). Aesthetic judgement, in this respect, carries a
paramount political significance in that it corresponds to the ability of reflective
judgement. As explicitly noted by Arendt (1973, 9), it does not rely on a prefabricated
register of abstract standards under which particular facts could simply be subsumed,
but calls upon us to Bmeet the phenomena, so to speak, head-on, without any
preconceived system.^
The existential aesthetic judging sensibility thus is well-suited to confront the absurd
condition of political judgement after world-shattering suffering and wrongdoing. This
is because it answers to the temporal, worldly condition of human existence and is able
to cope with the reality of the gap between past and future that, especially in the wake of
tragedy and evil, can no longer be bridged by drawing on established standards of
thought (see Arendt 2006, 13). For liberated from the quest for deeper causes and
realities, purposes and ends, aesthetic judgement affirms human freedom to look upon
the past anew and endow with (a general) meaning the particularity of the world of
appearances. As Arendt writes, aesthetic judgement is determined neither by Bthe life
interests of the individual nor the moral interests of the self,^ but parallels a
Bdisinterested^ pleasure or delight at the sight of Bthe world in its appearance and in
its worldliness^ (Arendt 2006, 219). In other words, it corresponds to a shift of focus
from a concern with the self to an attitude of Bloving care^ for the things of this world
that have no pre-given end, but whose essence is the appearance of freedom in the midst
of the world (Arendt 2006, 208, 222; Arendt 1989, 30–1, 76–7). Indeed, the political
significance of aesthetic sensibility, according to Arendt, can be traced to its unique
capacity of revealing human freedom as a source of worldly events and fostering the
view of human beings as actors and sufferers, not passive objects of metaphysical or
historical causes or ends (Arendt 1958, 186; Hill 1979, 298). For in this way, aesthetic
judgement is able to reclaim the particularity and plurality of past experiences from
under the grip of traditional categories and larger wholes, weave them into a meaningful
story, and make them part of the common world – thereby establishing the distinctively
human significance of politics and also appealing to our capacity for freedom and
political action in the future (see Benhabib 1990; Kristeva 2001).
This guiding concern is most explicitly developed in Arendt’s account of aesthetic
judgement as Brepresentative thinking^ (see Arendt 1989, 43; Arendt 2006, 217, 237).
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Representative thinking represents a reflective process of moving from the particular to
the general that remains always in close contact with the world by tying into its exercise
a consideration of a plurality of other perspectives on shared reality. Travelling freely
about the world and imagining what it looks like from a plurality of diverse standpoints,
representative thinking is able to face up to the ambiguity of political affairs because it
gives rise to a perspective of worldly impartiality or of judging Bfor the world’s sake^
(Arendt 2006, 51; Arendt 1968, 7–8). In this way, it can answer to Arendt’s (2006, 219)
crucial insight that political judgement concerns Bnot knowledge or truth,^ but Bthe
judicious exchange of opinion about the sphere of public life and the common world,
and the decision what manner of action is to be taken in it, as well as how it is to look
henceforth, what kind of things are to appear in it^ (see also Hayden 2014, 178–9;
2016, 35–7). For remaining loyal to human plurality, representative thinking does not
ascend to a Bdefinite,^ absolute perspective lying above the realm of political affairs,
but judges any particular occurrence Bin terms of its position in the world at any given
time^ (Arendt 1968, 8). In other words, it refrains from the rational, moral quest for
completeness and finality to instead retain attention on judgement’s proper aim – that is,
on understanding how and why past actions and events came about and echoed in the
midst of the common world, thereby engaging in reinvigoration of our sense of worldly
reality and thus also confronting the perplexity of responding to them in political action
(Arendt 2006, 257; see also Zerilli 2005, 161–3; Buckler 2011, 12, 45–6, 57–8, 107;
Fine 2008, 169–70).
In this respect, the narrative, representative judging sensibility can be counterposed
to what Camus and Arendt characterize as an attitude of ressentiment against the world
of political affairs and human condition as such. It is an attitude that came into its own
when, after the breakdown of eternal ideas, humans refused wonder at the plurality,
contingency and unpredictability of the appearing world and instead sought refuge
within their own selves. Consigning the human capacities of judgement and action to
the rule of reason that henceforth considered itself absolute, Bthe human^ aspired to
transform heaven and earth in accordance with its own blueprint, only to yield to
unbridled will to power and nihilistic politics. On this account, the desire to ultimately
tame and resolve the ambiguity and contradiction of the political world then also
signifies a dangerous disregard for its plural and unpredictable, that is, human character.
Worldly judgement, in contrast, is predicated upon an awareness that the independent,
complex, at times alien and incomprehensible, nature of the realm of political affairs
can never be completely resolved into thought if it is to retain its human character.
Accordingly, it commits to ceaselessly reconciling with and creatively responding to its
imperfect and tragic nature by illuminating it tentatively and never conclusively,
patiently holding fast to the plurality of perspectives on the world and constantly
exploring and encountering its boundaries (see Arendt 1994, 183–4; Camus 1970,
148–53, 168–71; see also Zaretsky 2013, 193). The paramount political significance of
narrative-inspired worldly judgement, that is, can be said to lie in its ability to reveal on
the ruins of history ever anew the contours of a shared, human world, and thereby
disclose the possibilities and limitations of political action as they reside in the
framework of the public realm and the plurality of perspectives constituting it.
In the third section, I will show how thus construed, narrative-inspired, representa-
tive judgement and its underlying purpose of reconciliation with reality can illuminate
forgiveness in its political significance by foregrounding it as a situated, worldly
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practice that is undertaken for the sake of human plurality and the common world. First,
however, I explore the suggested shift of focus from a moral to a worldly perspective
through two chosen literary works. Thence, I seek to disclose on concrete examples the
ways in which the moral, self-centred discourse on forgiveness risks obviating the
process of assuming responsibility for the world of human affairs – and how, in turn,
the existential aesthetic, worldly judging sensibility’s attentiveness to the situated
process of understanding and reconciling with past wrongs ties the decision on the
appropriateness of forgiveness to a sustained reflection on how the common world can
be rebuilt and how the tragedies of the past can be resisted in the future.
The political significance of forgiveness in Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela’s
a Human Being Died that Night and Vitomil Zupan’s Minuet for Guitar
A Human Being Died That Night is Gobodo-Madikizela’s account of her visits to and
conversations with Eugene de Kock, considered to be one of the most notorious
executors of the brutality of Apartheid in South Africa, a reputation that earned him
the nickname of BPrime Evil.^ The commanding officer of the counter-insurgency
police unit, responsible for countless killings, torture and murder of resistance activists,
de Kock was later tried and sentenced to a life in prison. Gobodo-Madikizela’s (2004,
52–7) journey in understanding focuses on BApartheid’s grand plan of corruption,^
trying to see how it might have conditioned de Kock’s actions and suppressed his
conscience and knowledge of right and wrong. She acknowledges that de Kock
exercised free will in committing the atrocities and should therefore be condemned,
yet also draws attention to Bthe sophistication and subtlety with which apartheid drew
its followers to support its mission^ (Gobodo-Madikizela 2004, 59). She acknowledges
how the system worked to rationalize murder as a necessary step in a legitimate fight
against the enemy, while at the same time blurring the lines of accountability, Bcreating
a grey zone of deniability that made it exceedingly difficult to determine the chain of
command,^ and allowing political leaders to deny any responsibility for past crimes (as
well as the broader systemic forces Bhatching^ them) (Gobodo-Madikizela 2004, 65).
De Kock himself notes how even though Binherently you know that killing is not
right,^ it was also Bsanctioned by the highest authority^ (Gobodo-Madikizela 2004,
74–5). He relates how during the killings he would shut off his awareness of the human
faces and his sense of reality, embalming them within the air of Bthe surreal^ (Gobodo-
Madikizela 2004, 76–7). His account also expresses bitterness against the politicians,
leaving him alone with a sense of disenchantment at having Bfought for nothing^ and
the terrible ordeal to confront his past (Gobodo-Madikizela 2004, 41, 78).
Considering the way de Kock’s conscience was shaped and suppressed by his
situation, Gobodo-Madikizela (2004, 58–9) concludes that despite the horrific nature
of their crimes, some perpetrators Bmay need our sympathy, because under corrupt
leadership they lacked appropriate models to stir them away from a violent path.^ De
Kock, too, is clearly repentant, suffering under the unbearable weight of the past,
expressing Bgenuine remorse and regret over destroying lives and severing the rela-
tionships that were connected to them^ and carrying Bthe voice of an outcast begging to
rejoin the world of the living^ (see Gobodo-Madikizela 2004, 114–16, 121). Touching
his hand and feeling pity for him as Ba human being capable of feeling, crying and
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knowing pain,^ however, also leaves the author ill at ease (Gobodo-Madikizela 2004,
35–8). The project of identifying with the perpetrator, of being drawn into his world,
which brings her into direct contact with the possibility of evil within herself and
further blurs any clear-cut boundaries between right and wrong, ensues in the feelings
of discomfort and fear (Gobodo-Madikizela 2004, 35–8, 116, 123).
The willingness to engage with and speak to the perpetrator, in Gobodo-
Madikizela’s account, then opens the possibility of setting his actions in a broader
political context, revealing how they were conditioned and even governed by external
forces beyond the control of the agent, and thereby also of seeing behind the monstrous
deeds once again a human being (see Gobodo-Madikizela 2004, 119–20). Yet, her
focus also remains directed on unveiling the inner Bmoral sensibility^ of the perpetra-
tor, before concealed Bunder the façade of ‘obedience to orders’ or righteous ‘duty to
my country’,^ and on encouraging him to recognize Bwhat he has done,^ and also that
Ball along, he knew that he was human and knew right from wrong^ (Gobodo-
Madikizela 2004, 119–20, 123). Gobodo-Madikizela, to be sure, shies away from
prescribing forgiveness, and instead links the forgiving disposition and willingness to
engage in dialogue to the challenge of creating conditions for the practice of building
new relationships and restoring broken ones – a challenge, she notes, not properly
appreciated and addressed within the orientation of retributive justice, narrowly focused
on a restoration of political and legal order and on Bmaking sure that people remain or
are put where they belong^ (see Gobodo-Madikizela 2004, 97, 126–7). Nevertheless,
she ties the judgement on whether or not to forgive to a change in psychological states
(Gobodo-Madikizela 2004, 95–7). Just as forgiveness would seem to be conditioned
upon remorse on the part of the perpetrators, its being granted is linked to an expression
of sympathy on the part of the victims (Gobodo-Madikizela 2004, 124–5, 98, 137–9).
By expressing remorse, it is held, the perpetrators come to acknowledge in the
previously unseen or disregarded perspectives of the victims human beings whose
humanity was unjustly denied (Gobodo-Madikizela 2004, 128, 130). Victims, in turn,
are inspired to empathetic understanding, granting forgiveness as a compassionate
response to another human being in pain and thereby restoring the offender back
among the ranks of the human community – even when a normative framework of
moral principles of justice would seem to preclude this possibility (Gobodo-Madikizela
2004, 126–9). Thus the victims and the perpetrators are mutually affirmed in their
common humanity. This newly restored coincidence of human consciousnesses that
Bseal[s] the cracks^ caused by past wrongs replaces the cycles of violence and revenge
with a vocabulary of tolerance, friendship and dialogue and leads to societal transfor-
mation and reconciliation (Gobodo-Madikizela 2004, 129, 126, 132–3).
Relying on a Bmoral compass^ already in place and imagining the practice of
forgiveness as a play between pure consciousnesses removed from their worldly
existence, however, this account in fact begs the question of the political significance
of forgiveness. Quite apart from the difficulty of verifying the authenticity of expres-
sions of remorse, we forgive simply because of the kind of compassionate and
empathetic people that we are and because of, for instance, our preference for or
commitment to values of solidarity, love and good will (see also Garrard and Mc-
Naughton 2010, 116–21; Griswold 2007, 65–6). What is thus obviated is precisely the
challenge that the often unimaginable instances of wrongdoing pose to our faculty of
judging on the appropriateness of forgiveness as well as the implications of this
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decision for the political world and our ways of interacting with each other. Far from
encouraging a renewal of relationship with the world and others, this take on forgive-
ness in fact leaves the perpetrator suffering under the weight of the past, alone and
resentful of the future, and risks placing the victim/spectator into a posture of self-
righteousness and moral superiority that shies away from coming to terms with the
tragic character of political action. Behind the banner of a perhaps unwitting presup-
position of an easy closure, it reveals a continued refusal to assume responsibility for,
and engage in shared struggles in, the world of human affairs.
In this respect, Gobodo-Madikizela’s account can be helpfully contrasted with
Vitomil Zupan’s novel, Minuet for Guitar. The novel tells the story of the partisan
soldier Berk and his experience of the horrid and senseless reality of war as a member
of the guerrilla resistance army during the Second-World-War Axis occupation of
Yugoslavia. Years later, during a holiday in Spain, Berk encounters Joseph Bitter, an
ex-German soldier and his former enemy. Parallel to and in many ways in conversation
with Berk’s recounting of the horrors, absurdities and ironies of war, runs his attempt to
engage Bitter in a dialogic, shared endeavour to make sense of the past. While avoiding
any explicit acts of apology and forgiveness, the novel arguably powerfully discloses a
relational, worldly judging orientation as well as the striving to come to terms with the
tragic character of the world it embodies.
In contrast to Gobodo-Madikizela’s account, Berk’s memories of war are first and
foremost characterized by a disconcerting and anxiety-inducing flight of meaning.
Through a scattered and purposeless depiction of endless marches and ambushes,
hunger and exhaustion, cruelty and killings, interspersed with introspective reflections,
surreal images and allusions to the broader historical context, the novel all too faithfully
reflects the author’s perplexing position as a consciously free and responsible human
being suddenly caught in the midst of foreign and hostile forces beyond his control and
calls into question any settled perspective or standard of judgement from which to gain
a comprehensible view of events and distinguish good from evil (Zupan 2011, 53, 112–
13). Crucially accompanying Berk’s absurd sensibility, however, is his deeply
entrenched commitment, felt throughout the novel, to human solidarity, his need to
weave bonds of fellowship as the only remaining route to a meaningful human life.
Once he encounters Bitter, sensing he could have been a soldier during the Second
World War, he is drawn to him, it seems, out of an existential, not fully articulate, yet
pressing need to converse with him, to relive the memories of the war with him and
thereby reach a better understanding of its inexplicable and senseless character (Zupan
2011, 34–5, 81). Thus Berk: BI did not yet know his name was Bitter. He walked and I
walked after him, as if we belonged together^ (Zupan 2011, 34).
Lying about his nationality and his own part in the war, Berk slowly learns that
Bitter was indeed a German Army soldier, for a time also fighting in the territory of
(ex-)Yugoslavia. At first highly reticent about himself, Bitter too soon reveals Ba
growing pleasure in talking about the war^ and finds in Berk a much needed compan-
ion (Zupan 2011, 146, 155–6). In his reflections, however, he views the war purely
from a military perspective. It is the standard of success that guides his rumination on
military tactics, strategy, and even on the human elements of fear and terror and a sense
of comradeship among the soldiers (Zupan 2011, 154–8). To Berk’s question of B[h]ow
was it that the Germans decided to occupy so much foreign territory,^ his response is:
Bwell, wasn’t it the same with any army in history?^ (Zupan 2011, 220). And further:
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Bblood is spilled in all wars, atrocities occur, people die, settlements are destroyed,
wide-eyed children meet a new way of life [...] there is nothing new in this^ (Zupan
2011, 148). When the question of guerrilla (resistance) fighters is brought up, Bitter
refers to them as Binsects^ and Bbandits,^ whose Bimprovisation^ in fighting and
Birresponsible^ forms of attack made them Ba hard nut for a regular army to crack^
(Zupan 2011, 124–5, 146, 120). He continues, B[o]f course, it was the hostages that
paid for it^ (Zupan 2011, 147). And even: Bmopping up would have been easier if they
had not had the civilian population on their side. You can’t exterminate them all, you
know. Then of course if we’d had more time^ (Zupan 2011, 125). Within his military
frame of mind, in short, Bitter seems unable to even pose the question of whether and
how the occupation and his participation in it might have been wrong, avoiding any
moral and political judgement on the legitimacy of means employed or ends pursued.
Berk, for his part, shies away from casting Bitter into the role of an evil occupier and
regards him as a human being similarly engulfed and subjected to the inhumanity of
larger forces of history. He acknowledges, for instance, that Bitter, too, had suffered,
Bthat the Allies had bombed him out of house and home,^ or that he still endures the
consequences of an injury caused by a guerrilla bomb attack: BBoth of us, my dear
Bitter, were mere pawns in the war^ (Zupan 2011, 37, 146–7, 148). Further, he self-
reflectively ponders about the forms of political mentality ruling Yugoslav politics
where the commitment to highest ideals hid a low-life opportunism and chauvinism –
setting up the conditions for foreign occupation to also lead to a bloody internal war
(Zupan 2011, 131, 274–5; 278–9, 54–5). Similarly, he admits that he too regarded the
feelings of hatred at the enemy a necessary part of the resistance struggle and was
unable to discern a human face behind the green helmets. Nevertheless, behind his
conscious refusal to divide the world and people into categories of good and evil, there
remains, it seems, a growing, even though not clearly expressed, tinge of accusation at,
even contempt for, his former enemy. What he refuses to accept, mocks and indirectly
condemns is Bitter’s lack of reflexivity and his thoughtlessness, his inability (or
unwillingness) to acknowledge or even inquire into how it was precisely the blind
obedience to superior orders and an uncritical loyalty to higher abstract principles of,
for instance, justice, god, nation or führer, that was able to lead humanity into an
unprecedented scourge of hatred, torture and murder (see Zupan 2011, e.g. 237, 147,
274–5, 54–5; 278–9). What he wishes to make Bitter realize, in other words, is the
effects his seemingly benign adherence to authority produced in the world and among
other human beings.
The conversation then in a way leads to a reinstatement of the old front between
enemies, at no point more clearly evident than when Bitter finds that Berk is actually a
Yugoslav (see Zupan 2011, 311–12, 323, 338–9). Yet, this realization also ensues in a
certain reframing of old hostilities and in at least a limited step towards mutual
recognition. Bitter goes first: B‘I suppose you were in the Partisans?’ ‘Bei den
Banditen?’ ‘Bei den Partisanen, hab’ ich g’sagt’.^ And Berk similarly: B‘I suppose
you were a member of the German National Socialist Party?’ ‘Ein Mitglied der blutigen
Hitler-Partei?’ Ein Mitgleid der N.S.D.A.P, hab’ ich g’sagt’^ (to which Bitter replies in
the negative) (Zupan 2011, 338–9). It is this step that can be said to enable them to
explicitly address the question of the meaning of past events for their lives in the
present and for the future. Later on, Berk finds out that, after the war, Bitter was
suffering from pangs of guilt and struggling to understand how and why Bcan it happen
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that a perfectly normal, orderly human being becomes the exact opposite^ (Zupan
2011, 365). Nevertheless, as a German citizen and soldier he refuses to see any linkage
between his actions and the ascending spiral of Nazi measures and politics that led to
war (and Holocaust). Escaping into the tragic embrace of collective guilt, while
rejecting any personal accountability, he assumes that the issue of political judgement
and of understanding was satisfactorily dealt with with the punishment of war criminals
at Nuremberg Trials, imposing no further imperatives on how to avoid such catastro-
phes in the future (see Zupan 2011, 339). Berk, on the contrary, refuses to reduce the
unprecedented Bedict of cruelty, a plan for ruthlessness and atrocity, an order that
enemies should perish in night and fog, without trace^ that characterized the past, to an
issue of eternal and seemingly necessary character of war or to human animality (Zupan
2011, 342, 366–7). He accordingly states: BSo it’s not only a matter of war as such,
Herr Bitter. And it is also true that not all wars are the same^ (Zupan 2011, 342).
Parallel to his efforts at understanding the past, thus, runs his pronounced awareness of
the need to remain attentive to and respond to the exigencies and dangers of the present
political situation, above all the lingering Bideological blizzard that besets the world^
(Zupan 2011, 341). To these ruminations, Bitter replies simply: BYou’re an unhappy
man, aren’t you?^ (Zupan 2011, 341). Berk’s continued refusal Bto fraternize with the
enemy^ (see Zupan 2011, 367), then, seems more likely a response to Bitter’s com-
placency in the present, his refusal to engage his freedom in the world, to recognize
what happened and assume responsibility for it, rather than any of the specific crimes
he committed in the past.
While affirming his separateness from Bitter, their shared ruminations on the war
nevertheless lead Berk to sharpen his insights into how, in the midst of the often
overwhelming meaninglessness, atrocity, political crime, stupidity and shallowness
ruling his time, it might still be possible to rebuild and sustain a human world. In
particular, he is insistent on upholding the value and keeping alive the memory of ties
of comradeship and Bfamily warmth^ woven among the partisan resistance fighters
involved in what he affirms to be a legitimate fight against the foreign occupiers (Zupan
2011, 317, 166–7, 279, 269). Especially important in this respect is his friendship with
Anton, with whom they form Ba new, common self,^ Blike two drops of water which
come close to each other and then, after a momentary tremor, leap together to form one
single drop^ (Zupan 2011, 329, 291). It is a unity born of and sustained through
Bagreement^ as well as Bclashing and rebounding,^ Ban atmosphere of possessiveness
and liberation^ – where neither of the two was any longer a self-sustaining, separate
self, but depended on the other for understanding and meaning, yet which nevertheless
was not reducible to the pursuit of a higher end that would eliminate their individuality
and difference (see Zupan 2011, 329, 291–2, 279, 297–9). Berk’s emphasis on the
forms of human solidarity, on the one hand, thus makes him particularly alert and wary
against the quickly shaping tendency within the liberation movement to render the goal
of freedom into a new ideological end of political action to which all individuality must
be sacrificed and for the achievement of which all means are justified (see Zupan 2011,
357–62). On the other hand, however, the experience of human solidarity also affirms
Berk in the awareness that a proper response to the absurd Bdegeneration of our ideals,^
does not lie in an embittered and contemptuous individualistic escape from new wars,
suspicion, double-talk, and cunning brewing on the horizon. Instead, it rests in a
continuous and often painful effort to create islands of humanity in the midst of
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dehumanizing forces of history by a steadfast refusal to forget and a willingness to
share and exchange one’s experiences with others (Zupan 2011, e.g. 369, 383–7).
Berk’s realization of both the utmost importance and difficulty of engaging and
speaking with his former enemy, gains a parallel confirmation in his somber, yet
vigilant promise that, shorn of long lost ideals, refuses to give up on the world of
human affairs: BSee you in the next war.^
The Political Significance of Forgiveness, Love of the World,
and the Ambiguity of Assuming Responsibility for Past Wrongs
The paramount importance of the representative judging capacity for thinking the
political significance of forgiveness then can be said to lie in its willingness to depart
from any pre-established standard, including the lures of empathy, and open itself to
consider the outside world and separate others in their particularity. For in its acts of
imaginative world-travelling, of actively reclaiming a plurality of memories on the past,
worldly judgement first of all allows for Bthings [to] become public,^ for painful pasts
to become a part of shared reality (see Zerilli 2012, 21–2, 23) – and is thus already
engaged in the tentative process of reconciling with reality. As such, it is especially
relevant to face up to the challenge of forgiveness in instances of grave suffering and
wrongdoing that – as alluded to above – do not simply represent a violation of a pre-
given and valued moral principle, but a thorough shattering of the very world, of shared
modes of interaction and meaning, within which the crimes and experiences of loss and
suffering could be recognized and vindicated (Carse and Tirrell 2010, 51–2). As Carse
and Tirrell (2010, 49) argue drawing on the statements of the survivors of the Rwandan
genocide, the sense of disorientation, shattered identity and chaos after grave wrongs
corresponds to being Bbetrayed by life.^ Within this horizon, the rational, self-centred
model of forgiveness is inadequate: its reliance on deliberate gestures of apology and
repentance, that is, can find no secure ground of the world that would bestow on these
acts an intersubjectively shared significance and foreground them as meaningful
responses to a painful past (Carse and Tirrell 2010, 45). Carse and Tirrell (2010, 46–
7) note an example of a survivor of the Rwandan genocide who chose to forgive so as
to Bfind tranquillity^ and not to Bsuffer my whole life long asking myself why they tried
to cut me.^ Yet, this example of forgiveness mirrors a Bunilateral shift,^ explicitly
directed at survivor’s inner peace and healing that at the same time manifests an
abandonment of Ball hope in the possibility of reconciliation and mutual
understanding^ (Carse and Tirrell 2010, 47). Many other testimonies, in contrast, affirm
the meaninglessness and offensiveness of forgiveness in light of the outrageous crimes:
BI can’t imagine any forgiveness capable of drying up all this spilled blood^ (Carse and
Tirrell 2010, 50, 44; see also Staub and Pearlman 2001, 207).
On this basis and similarly to the existential account of worldly judgement, Carse
and Tirrell (2010) call for a shift to a model of forgiveness that is based on practices of
Bworld-building.^ This view emphasizes the importance of Bgenerating^ a shared
framework or ground within which the victims and perpetrators can move from radical
distrust and apathy to the development of relationships of mutual recognition and
understanding, and also reclaim their capacity of active engagement with and in the
world (Carse and Tirrell 2010, 50–1). As such, it is Binherently relational^ in its
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insistence that the possibility of moral repair only lies Bin relationship with, rather than
disconnection from,^ others (Carse and Tirrell 2010, 48, 50). The existential worldly
judging sensibility is well-suited to confront this relational character of forgiveness
because, as Arendt (1989, 43; 2006, 51) explicitly points out, it does not involve a
desire to penetrate the ultimate and innermost subjectivity of the perpetrators and
simply adopt their views – a tendency, as we have seen, that can be morally
compromising or damaging for the victims and the broader circle of spectators, and
leave all sides alienated from the common world (Carse and Tirrell 2010, 58).Worldly
judgement’s engagement with the perpetrators instead is intent on viewing the world
from their perspective, considering the possibilities (and alternative courses of action)
available to them as well as how they themselves made sense of their lives, choices and
crimes (see Schaap 2005, 70, 72; LaCaze 2014, 214; Griswold 2007, 87–8). By the
same token, as well demonstrated in Berk’s dialogue with Bitter, representative judge-
ment on whether or not to forgive does not amount to a complacent and self-righteous
moralism that would exhaust itself in a moral denunciation of a painful past. Instead, it
implies a willingness to undertake a critical self-scrutiny of one’s own actions and the
broader field of relationships and structures that conditioned them. As such, it helps to
displace the crude victim/perpetrator dichotomy that usually lingers in the wake of
mass injustice and conflict, showing how many conflicts may not allow for any clear-
cut divisions between right and wrong (Scott 2010, 12–13). For while the partners in
dialogue on this view may well remain on opposite poles, the representative judging
sensibility nevertheless discloses a common world laying in-between them, prying
open a space for shared reflection on how worldly reality had similarly placed them
all at the mercy of alien, even incomprehensible forces beyond their control.
Remaining loyal to the plurality of the political world, then, representative judgement
displaces the focus on penetrating the ultimate nature of the experience of suffering and
injustice and reaching an easy, conclusive attribution of blame. Rather, it retains
attention on disclosing particular actions and events in their worldly appearance, letting
their meaning (or value judgement) surface tentatively, and never unambiguously, out of
a consideration of both how they emerged Bin the midst of human society,^ within the
web of human relationships, and of how they echoed in the common world, how they
bore upon the human, political status of a plurality of individuals constituting it (see
Arendt 1994, 404). In this way, representative, worldly judgement also reveals the
distinctly political significance of a decision on whether or not to forgive by
foregrounding the need for it to be arrived at dialogically and from within the worldly
situation, rather than pronounced from on high. For in confronting past wrongdoings
and sufferings in their appearance in the world, on the one hand, it allows for an
appreciation of the tragedy of political action, disclosing the grounds for forgiveness
in how, conditioned and perhaps suffused by the broader field of worldly relationships,
human engagement in the world is able to produce a plethora of unforeseen conse-
quences. It can, for example, trace the ways in which individuals’ embeddedness in the
world, in particular in the broader field of unjust and oppressive relationships or
institutions, may have made their perhaps seemingly benign actions ensue in radical
denials of freedom and humanity of certain individuals or groups. On the other hand, it is
also attuned to a careful drawing of distinctions as to the wrongfulness of the past
crimes. It is able to differentiate, for instance, between those offences that lie Bin the very
nature of action’s constant establishment of new relationships within a web of relations,^
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and those that are destructive of the political realm and constitute an affront against the
human status (Arendt 1958, 240; see also LaCaze 2014, 213).
In revealing the source of perhaps previously unimaginable suffering and unprece-
dented wrongdoing in the tragedy of human involvement in the world, worldly
judgement thus also refrains from envisioning forgiveness in terms of a pre-determined,
moral end. Instead, it foregrounds it as a continuous, interactive process which, prior to
(or even more importantly than) explicit acts of repentance and forgiveness, involves
gestures and practices oriented towards sharing, understanding and rebuilding of the
common world (see also Griswold 2007, 98; Carse and Tirrell 2010, 55–6; Staub and
Pearlman 2001, 215–16, 221).4 As such, however, the process of forgiveness also is
marred by complexity, inevitably bearing the elements of risk and uncertainty (Staub
and Pearlman 2001, 218; Carse and Tirrell 2010, 58). The existential aesthetic sensi-
bility explicitly brings out and tackles this political, ambiguous dimension, by
foregrounding forgiveness as a practice undertaken for the sake of human plurality
and of the common world. Focusing on the worldly environment of past wrongdoing
and suffering, it refuses to fixate perpetrators in the role of either inherently monstrous
villains or helpless victims of inhuman forces. Similarly, representative judgement on
whether or not to forgive resists the prevalent moral tendency to tie the affirmation of
the victims’ identity and dignity to a pre-fabricated prescription on what former
wrongdoers are supposed to be like or how they are supposed to change. Instead, it
ties former enemies indissolubly together through the mediation of the shared reality,
fostering the possibility for their recognizing each other as equal members of the
common world and capable of affirming their freedom in the future. Eschewing the
quest for a complete coincidence or final communion between human consciousnesses
(e.g. Camus 1971, 130), that is, the narrative judging sensibility contains an appeal to
the freedom of both victims and the perpetrators to engage itself in the world and
participate in the shared endeavour to rebuild relationships and institutions in ways that
broaden and foster, rather than restrain, the space for mutual recognition and the human
ability to be free together. This worldly orientation is particularly significant in those
frequent cases where two or more sides are engulfed in an ever-widening spiral of
mutual denunciations, hatred and violence (Staub and Pearlman 2001, 206, 217). For
furthering an appreciation of how the crimes of one side fuel and even offer justification
for the crimes of the other, it may inspire all parties to the conflict to engage in forms of
action that would appease, rather than provoke, further violence. At the same time, the
activity of judging for the sake of the world also remains attentive to the possibility of
individuals (or groups) whose actions have (or continue to) so radically obliterated
human plurality and the shared reality that they cannot be forgiven and reconciled with
as equal members of the common world.
The existential aesthetic judgement oriented by the principle of love of the world, to
be sure, avoids issuing a technical prescription or a clear-cut guideline on whether and
when forgiveness should be awarded, affirming the ambiguity of a new beginning. Yet,
in its attention to the situated process of reconciling with past wrongs, it is able to bring
4 Examining the possibilities for forgiveness in the aftermath of the Rwandian genocide, Carse and Tirrell
(2010, 53–6) and Staub and Pearlman (2001, 221, 224–5), for instance, emphasize the importance of
community groups that promote an exchange between the victims, perpetrators and the broader public, either
in the form of engaging them in joint projects, or in the sharing of painful experiences and understanding of the
situational factors that made the genocide possible.
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out forgiveness in its paramount political significance, showing how it contains the
possibility of re-establishing relationships with others and the common world (see
Arendt 1958, 237, 241). For what it displaces is the assumption still permeating the
predominant moral discourse on forgiveness, that one’s intentions can be neatly
separated from the broader field of worldly processes and interactions conditioning
an action and causing for it to produce a plethora of unforeseen consequences. This
presumption is problematic because, while recognizing the worldly context of past
wrongs, it also acknowledges the fact of our embeddedness in a web of forces beyond
our control only insofar as it is said to release us from the burden of assuming
responsibility for our actions, that is, to a certain extent, let us Boff the hook^ (see
Card 1996, 22–3). As such, it contains a variation of the traditional philosophical claim
to autonomy. This claim, for instance, can be seen in attempts to reduce the burden of
assuming responsibility for the past to the matter of ascribing judicial culpability and
holding the perpetrators absolutely accountable for their actions. Yet, the challenge of
coming to terms with painful pasts might similarly be obscured if the process of
assuming responsibility is consigned to an essentially inner reckoning with one’s
conscience and envisioned to proceed on the basis of public expressions of remorse,
repentance and atonement as manifestations of the required (and predetermined)
change in the moral identity of the wrongdoers (and bystanders) (see Schaap 2001,
757). For what is again missed is precisely what is involved in the situated, ambiguous
process of reconciling with the tragic nature of political action: how to affirm the reality
of human freedom in the midst of an untameable world and assume responsibility for
events and occurrences that we had never wished or intended, yet that nevertheless and
irreversibly constitute a part of our shared reality (see Zerilli 2005, 163; Herzog 2014,
186; Kruks 2012, 34–5).
Worldly judgement, in this respect, resists the temptation to conceive of forgiveness
as a sovereign act, by which the human subjectivity is imagined to be able to take upon
its shoulders the whole brunt of responsibility for itself and the world, and reach an
ultimate redemption for past crimes. For constantly disclosing the world in its particular
and plural character, it remains ever attentive to how this temptation may in fact
alleviate a sense of responsibility for our shared reality – not only rendering unneces-
sary the continued efforts to engage in and with the world and respond to its challenges,
but also leading to a willingness to accept further erasures and injustice as a legitimate
and necessary path towards final reconciliation (see Hayden 2009, 10–31; Muldoon
2009, 11). Instead, orienting the appropriateness and practice of forgiveness by the
principle of Bfor the sake of the world,^ it is able to trace the tragedy of the past to the
very conditions ruling the world of political affairs, and thereby disclose how suffering
and wrongdoing were made possible precisely by human interdependence and the
ensuing vulnerability that represent the most distinct characteristics of our sharing-the-
world-with-others (see also Griswold 2007, 49, 110, 133–5). By implication, represen-
tative judgement oriented by love of the world – as Card suggests in her discussion of
moral luck – directs attention to and kindles our sense of responsibility for the forms of
relationships and community nurtured and sustained as well as to the medium of
political structures and institutions, and how they work to constrain or widen the
possibilities for individual judgement and action (see Card 1996, x, 22–3). While
acknowledging suffering as an inevitable part of our embodied, worldly existence,
the political significance of forgiveness, in this respect, lies in its ability to constantly
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rediscover the world as a source of human solidarity as the only point of support in the
fight against its tragic nature (Camus 1995, 28) – directing attention to the question
of what kinds of relationships and forms of community, that is, the in-betweens of
the world, between former enemies can and should be rebuilt, nurtured and
sustained.
Concluding Thoughts: Forgiveness and Coming to Terms with the Tragic
Nature of Political Action
The article has sought to explore the political challenge and significance of
forgiveness as an indispensable response to the inherently imperfect and tragic
nature of human, political life through the lens of the existential narrative-inspired
representative judging sensibility. For this purpose, it drew on its ability to kindle
the process of coming to terms with the tragedy of political action, of reconciling
with the world that, especially in the wake of mass injustice and suffering, dons
the appearance of an absurd, impenetrable and shapeless weight, devoid of human
significance. The existential worldly judging sensibility, I argued, is particularly
well-suited to confront this challenge because it is able to engage reality in its
particularity, plurality and unpredictability, disclose how past suffering and wrong-
doing arose from the perplexity of human engagement in the world, and thereby
also constantly illuminate the political world as a shared, human world. In its
world-building capacity, thus, it brought to light the distinctly political significance
of forgiveness by foregrounding it as a practice undertaken for the sake of human
plurality and the common world. Grounded in the situated, ambiguous process of
reconciling with and assuming responsibility for past wrongs, worldly judgement
revealed that forgiveness cannot purport to ultimately mend, perfect, contain or flee
the imperfect and tragic nature of the world, precluding the possibility of an
ultimate redemption for past crimes. Tracing the tragedy of the past to the very
conditions ruling the world of political affairs, instead, it honestly confronted the
main political challenge of forgiveness in a recognition that the outside world and
separate others do not represent a hindrance, but the very condition, for good or
bad, of our freedom. While acknowledging suffering as an inevitable part of our
embodied, worldly existence, the political significance of forgiveness, in this
respect, can be said to lie in a determination to confront the tragedy of politics
by appealing to the promise of human solidarity, constantly striving to create the
space for dialogue, further mutual understanding, and build relationships and
institutions that are welcoming to human plurality.
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